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ABSTRACT
Deep learning models are vulnerable to adversarial examples which
are input samples modified in order to maximize the error on the
system. We introduce Spartan Networks, resistant deep neural net-
works that do not require input preprocessing nor adversarial train-
ing. These networks have an adversarial layer designed to discard
some information of the network, thus forcing the system to focus
on relevant input. This is done using a new activation function to
discard data. The added layer trains the neural network to filter-out
usually-irrelevant parts of its input. Our performance evaluation
shows that Spartan Networks have a slightly lower precision but
report a higher robustness under attack when compared to unpro-
tected models. Results of this study of Adversarial AI as a new
attack vector are based on tests conducted on the MNIST dataset.
KEYWORDS
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1 ON THE MOTIVATIONS FOR ROBUST DEEP
LEARNING
Neural networks and deep learning. Neural networks are machine
learning algorithms that are mainly used for supervised learning.
They rely on stacked layers of neurons. These stacked layers take a
fixed-length input tensor and generate another output fixed-length
tensor. The input/output function is differentiable relatively to its
weights. By using gradient-based optimisation on large datasets to
update the weights —a process also refered to as “training"— the
various layers generate output tensors whose values are a pattern-
matching-value of their input, allowing these algorithms to detect
features. Deep Learning consists of stacking a large amount of
layers, allowing a neural network to extract features of features
and thus grasp more abstract and complex characteristics from the
input. Deep Neural Networks (DNN) have drawn a lot of attention
recently.
In the last decade, DNN have revolutionized the automation of
perceptive tasks in various domains, especially in computer vision.
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Deep Learning is increasingly used in autonomous driving software
[6], malware analysis [44] (with attacks already implemented on
detection systems [20, 25]), and fake news detection [1].
These technological improvements are already being used in
safety-critical environments such as vehicles or factories, where
automated driving for the former and predictive maintenance for
the latter may save millions of dollars and thousands of lives.
New Attack Vector. In late 2013, Szegedy et al.[41] discovered a new
kind of vulnerability in DNN: given a neural network, the authors
propose an alogrithm to generate samples that are missclassified
while retaining their meaning to the human cognitive system. This
groundbreaking discovery created an entirely new threat model
against machine learning powered applications. Several attacks
have then been discovered. As an example, The Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) [18] gives a reliable attack method against DNN.
This method exploits the neural network instability to small adver-
sarial input variations. This means that two samples that slightly
differ from each other can be classified differently, even if they are
indistinguishable for a human observer. The FGSM iteratively adds
or substracts a small value ϵ to each element of the input tensor.
This simple method yields surprisingly powerful attacks: on FGSM-
generated adversarial samples[18], precision of these algorithms
can drop from 99% to less than 20%.
While classfier-evasion techniques are widely studied, DNN cre-
ate an original problem as its lack of explainability and high sensi-
tivity make them vulnerable to undistinguishable evasive samples.
The performance of DNN also works against them: users tend to
trust these systems because of their comparable performance to
humans on some narrow tasks. This new attack vector does not ex-
ploit vulnerable code logic, but abuses users’ trust in the classifier’s
complex decision boundaries.
Potentially any deep learning model can be vulnerable to this
kind of attack, which is hard to detect, prevent, and whose impact
will only grow in the upcoming years.
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1.1 Adversarial Examples and the Clever Hans
Effect
The vulnerability of these models to adversarial inputs brings forth
another issue. If deep learning algorithms are seeing patterns that
a human being can not see under normal conditions[14], this means
that the models suffer from the so-called Clever Hans effect. This
term, popularized by Papernot et al. [35], comes from a horse that
was deemed capable of complex arithmetical operations, where in
fact the animal was guessing the actual answer from the uncon-
scious behaviour of the audience.
The Clever Hans effect is the product of three observations :
(1) Samples that are not generated by adversaries (i.e. sane sam-
ples) are almost always well classified by deep learning algo-
rithms.
(2) Samples that are generated by adversaries (i.e. adversarial
samples) are likely to be misclassified by deep learning algo-
rithms.
(3) Human observers can still classify samples generated by
adversaries given enough time [14].
We can thus deduce that:
• deep learning algorithms focus on features that are not es-
sential to the true class of a sample.
• features captured by deep learning algorithms during train-
ing are not the same as those learned by human beings over
the course of their lives.
Although the work of [14] shows common vulnerabilites be-
tween learning algorithms and a biological learning process, we
can still state that the current learning behaviour of these algo-
rithms do not capture the actual meaning carried by the sample.
1.2 Overview of our Work
In our work, we consider that the current training dynamics of DNN
creates their sensitivity to adversarial input. We will hypothesize
on the characteristics of the algorithm causing devious behaviour,
and we will create a minimal deep learning algorithm constrained
to function without them.
We will study adversarial image classification as this community
has created a large number of attacks and defenses. This plethora
of research is due to the simplicity of the image space topology.
For example, if one changes a pixel, or slighly varies the colors of
various pixels in a panda image, the image still resembles a panda.
On the other hand, trying to preserve the semantics of a ASM-x86
code while randomly changing a few lines of code would yield very
different results.
Thus, we define Spartan Networks, and apply the general frame-
work to Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN), as they are the
state-of-the-art for image classification.
Our hypotheses on the current CNN are as follows:
(1) The behaviour of the function Fnn approximated by the CNN
is locally linear, thus allowing an attacker to easily explore
the system’s state space.
(2) Around sane datapoints, the function Fnn is sensitive to
features that do not make sense to a human observer.
As we consider perturbations to be unnecessary information
taken into account by the network, we try to create a network that
learns to ignore parts of the information it is given.
In this paper, we propose a new type of DNN, the Spartan Net-
works, based on two conflicting elements forced to collaborate
during the training phase:
• Firstly, the filtering layers severely reduce the amount of in-
formation they give to the next layer. They are constrained to
output the lowest amount of information through a filtering
loss.
• Secondly, the other layers connected to the previous ones
constitute a standard CNN trying to rely on the information
given to minimize its training loss.
These two parts are competing against each other: if the filter-
ing layer destroys all the information, the filtering loss is low, but
the network cannot train, and thus the training loss is high. On
the opposite, a CNN training given unlimited information allows
the network to train efficiently, reaching a low training loss, but
increasing the filtering loss.
This construction thus constitutes a self-adversarial neural net-
work. The weighted sum of those two losses forces the filtering
layer to find the vital pieces of information the rest of the network
needs to successfully train. The network thus learns to focus on
less information, and selects more relevant features in order to
maximise its performance.
This paper is organized as follows. A taxonomy of attacks spe-
cific to machine learning-powered applications is given Section 2.
We describe the various test-time adversarial attacks among the
aforementioned attacks in section 3. We present the various defense
attempts in the litterature in Section 4. We explain the motivations
for Spartan Networks in Section 5. We define candidate implemen-
tations of our proof-of-concept (PoC) in Section 6. We evaluate and
discuss the results in Section 7. In Section 8, we will balance out
the performance drop with the robustness gain to evaluate the rele-
vance of Spartan Networks. We will conclude and present future
work in Section 9.
2 ATTACKING A NEURAL NETWORK
2.1 Threat Model
There are two main attack vectors available to an adversary to
hinder a DNN’s performance: Train-Time (or Poisoning), and Test-
Time Adversarial Attacks.
Train-Time Attack. This attack aims at modifying a dataset, by either
adding patterns into existing samples, or adding new samples. The
attacker’s intent is to manipulate a deep neural network’s training
on this dataset in order to:
• create a backdoor, which is a range of samples that are miss-
classified by the target network when it has been trained
on the poisoned dataset. As an example, this could allow an
attacker to evade malware detection for a specific type of
malware, meaning the system would catch other malware
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with high accuracy, increasing user’s trust in the system, but
let the attacker’s malware through.
• diminish the overall accuracy of the neural network when
trained on the poisoned dataset. As an example, an attacker
could feed poisonned data that would cause an algorithm to
extract the wrong features, causing additional data curation
cost.
Plausible attack scenarios within this threat model are given by Gu
et al. [22].
Test-Time Attack. In this type of attack, the neural network is al-
ready trained, its parameters are frozen and the attacker can only
movewithin the space of all possible inputs. The attacker’s objective
is to find a sample xadv that is:
• close to a sample x correctly classified in class y
• classified in a different class yadv , y
The main hypothesis here is that when two samples are close,
their meaning stays the same to a human observer.
If the attacker succeeds most of the time for adversarial samples
reasonably close, it can reliably output samples indistinguishable
from sane samples, that a classifier would fail to categorize well.
For example, an attacker trying to bypass an automated content
filter could take shocking pictures, slightly modify them, and suc-
cesfully bypass the filter. As the samples are close to their original
counterpart, their meaning would be preserved.
More formally, we replace the closeness by a distance between
input and adversarial input, and get a constrained optimization
problem:
Given a classifier f , a distance D, a perturbation amplitude
budget ϵ , an attacker tries to find the minimal λ on a sample x , with
a ground truth label y such that :
f (x) = y
f (x + λ) = yadv ,yadv , y
D(x ,x + λ) < ϵ
(1)
Note that without the ϵ budget constraint, we could generate
misclassifications by using a correctly classified input from another
class.
In most cases, this distance is replaced by a standard Ln ,n ∈
{0, 1, 2} or L∞ norm for the perturbation λ. We depict below the
various standard norms, with λ = (λi )i ∈[[1,k ]]
Norm name Mathematical expression
L0 L0(λ) = #{i |λi , 0}
L1 L1(λ) = ∑i |λi |
L2 L2(λ) =
√∑
i λ
2
i
Ln Ln (λ) = n
√∑
i λ
n
i
L∞ L∞(λ) = maxi (|λi |)
In the rest of this paper we will focus on the Test-Time Attack,
as this is where the attack surface is the largest.
3 THREAT MODELS FOR TEST-TIME
ATTACKS
There are various ways to attack a deep learning algorithm at test
time. We contextualise the attacks by defining the different attack
scenarios.
In order to understand the implications of adversarial examples,
we will give a security equivalent of our attack scenario through a
simple example. This will link the new attack vector to otherwise
known attack vectors in the domain of information security.
3.1 Attack scenario
In order to place ourselves in an information security context, we
may consider a simple setup:
• The defender runs a check digit identification software pow-
ered by DNN on the target computer. It is the only program
available on this system.
• The attacker can send samples of checks. They have access to
a very small digit database. Their original check is correctly
classified with the right amount, but they aim at maliciously
changing the input image in order to get a different check
value.
• Opportunity: Through two accounts, the attacker can send
checks to himself. They can thus check if the system is vul-
nerable.
3.2 Attacker’s access to knowledge
As with any attack, attacks on Deep Learning vary on the knowl-
edge the attacker has on the system prior to the attack.
White-Box Attacks. In White-Box mode, the attacker has access
to every parameter of the Neural Network. In this scenario, the
attacker has a read-only access to the all parameters of the algorithm
by the means of an ill-protected file.
Gray-Box Attacks. In Gray-Box mode, the attacker has access
to some parameters of the Neural Network, while some remain
unkown to them. A common scenario is that the attacker knows
the structure of the Deep Neural Network, but not the parameters.
In this case, the attacker has managed to get a restricted account
on the server, showing only the code used to train, but not the
admin-owned weights parameter.
Black-Box Attacks. In Black-Box mode, the attacker has no access
to the Neural Network other than through its inferences, like any
normal user. In our scenario, this means that the attacker has no
access to the server other than the check submission point.
3.3 Attacker’s Objective
Regardless of the operational objectives, we give the two main tech-
nical objectives attackers can set when they attack deep learning
algorithms.
Untargeted Attack. When the attack is untargeted, the attacker’s
objective is to create any misclassification they can, with no control
over the yadv in equation 1. In our scenario, the attacker tries to
trigger a misclassification from the real digit class.
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Targeted Attack. When the attack is targeted, the attacker’s ob-
jective is to trick the algorithm into classifying the input in a class
chosen by the attacker, with complete control over the yadv . In our
scenario, and for simplicity, the attacker tries to classify all digits as
a 9 digit. We will consider that it can only attain this goal through
a targeted attack.
We summarize the attack characteristics with respect to our
scenario below :
Attack Attacker in the Scenario
White-Box Already has access to privileged information
Gray-Box Already has access to restricted information
Black-Box Has no access to any information
Targeted Wants to get a 9999 $ check
Untargeted Wants to modify the check’s value
We create an array from the last two sections, and get the fol-
lowing example attackers. U is for Untargeted, T for Targeted :
White-Box Gray-Box Black-Box
U Disruption Rogue Employee DoS extortion
T Smash-and-Grab Fraud Theft
We describe the scenarios:
Disruption. When the attacker has access to every information
in the neural network, we consider that they already have access
to a privileged account. For the sake of this example, we consider
the case of an attacker with root access that wants to minimize
its footprint. By allowing themselves to only read the parameters,
the attacker can create a copy of the neural network then use it to
disrupt business by forcing bank employees to manually review all
checks emitted by the attacker.
Rogue Employee. In this context, an IT employee with a restricted
account and thus some information on the neural network could
trigger a misclassification on the system, and disrupt business by
creating subtle modifications on all the checks submitted through
its interface.
Denial of Service (DoS) extortion. When the attacker has no access
to the system, anymisclassification from the original class will allow
an attacker to get some form of disruption. If an attacker prints
check paper with adversarial patterns on it, they can extort money
from the bank by threatening to cause user mistrust and employee
time to manually review checks.
Smash-and-Grab. When the attacker is given White-Box access
through a visible root access, they can create a base of malicious
digit samples allowing them to transform any 4-digit check into a
9999$ check. From this, the attackers could submit some malicious
checks and take their money whenever possible.
Fraud. In this case, the attacker could be another rogue employee
trying to do more than disruption by targetting all the digits to be
9.
Theft. This is the worst scenario. If successful, the attacker can
create a target misclassification with only access to the computer,
completely controlling the value of the check.
These attacks could be seen as less risky variants of physically
tampering the check’s value. If caught, the attacker can blame
the system, by arguing that a human reviewer can perfectly see
the check’s actual value. As these attacks are almost riskless and
costless for attacker but disruptive for the defender, these AI attacks
constitute an interesting field of study from an information security
perspective.
These attacks are not limited to the banking system. As an ex-
ample, deep learning algorithms are currently used in autonomous
driving [6], malware analysis (with already an arms race between
attacks and defenses [20, 25, 44]), healthcare[15], and fake news
detection[1].
3.4 Main attacks implemented against Deep
Learning
For each attack, we will give a formal mathematical definition.
We will then write an equivalent attack to understand the inner
workings of the algorithm.
First attack discovered. A lot of attacks aiming at generating ad-
versarial samples have been developped in the last five years, since
the discovery by Szegedy et al. [41] of a L-BFGS-driven line-search
attack. It is the first method known to generate adversarial image
samples that are extremely close to their innocuous counterparts.
This attack tries to minimize the distance between the original
sample and a modified, misclassified sample, until it is close enough
to be indistinguishable from the original. It is a way for an attacker
to optimize, for different values of a perturbation norm constraint,
a loss-maximization problem until it finds an optimally undistin-
guishable sample.
3.4.1 FGSM. The Fast Gradient Sign Method or FGSM tries to
modify a sample by adding or substracting a small value epsilon for
each dimension of the input. More formally, the attacker generates
a perturbation vector λ such that :
λ = ϵ sgn(∇xL(f (x),y))
In untargeted mode, the attacker adds a small noise over the in-
put, adding ±ϵ to every dimension of the input in order to increase
the error, choosing the sign accordingly.
In targeted mode, the attacker generates the highest output for
the desired class, and thus the lowest error relatively to the adver-
sary’s target. The vector thus becomes :
λ = −ϵ sgn(∇xL(f (x),yadv ))
Where L is the network’s loss function.
In both cases, a clipping is made to make sure the values stay
in their original range. The sum, along hundreds of dimensions, of
small input/output error gradients can result in a large perturbation.
Thus, an attacker can easily push the sample through a decision
boundary and trick the system into a misclassification.
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This attack is easy to compute and, for some unprotected classi-
fiers, creates large errors. Computing the gradient values requires
a White-Box access to the network.
The FGSM on the field. As the FGSM is aWhite-Box attack, the
attacker needs access to privileged information. Using the informa-
tion, the attacker takes a picture of any check. The original sample
is likely to be classified as the original check. The attacker then
computes, for each color channel of each pixel, whether they add
or substract, ϵ to each value, by looking at the sign of the loss’
gradient with respect to every dimension of its input.
The ϵ value is chosen according to a tradeoff: the lower the value,
the closer the picture will be to the original one, thus making it
harder for a system administrator to see whether there was an
attack or not. On the other hand, the larger ϵ is, the higher the
chances are for the attack to work.
3.4.2 Carlini &Wagner attack. Carlini &Wagner [9] have proposed
an attack method based on a custom gradient descent with different
candidate losses in order to learn the perturbation the same way the
network learns.
One cannot use the optimization problem in (1) to find adversar-
ial samples directly. Rather, loss functions point toward the main
direction of attack while perturbation norm stays a constraint that
can be hard (strict constraint) or loose [9]. In the latter, going further
from the constraint adds to the loss.
The loss used by the authors in [9] is a composite based on the
original network’s loss. They try different losses, linked to different
attack behaviours.
These loss functions force the adversary to learn a perturbation
that maximizes the confidence of the system on its erroneous deci-
sion. When using a loose constraint, they smooth out the clipping
process. As the constraints become differentiable, the authors allow
gradient-based methods to converge into a local optimum for their
problem.
Carlini &Wagner attacks on the field. An attacker needs awhite-
box access to the classifier. They would use a gradient descent
method, incorporating one of the losses proposed by the authors.
This sample generation algorithm obeys two constraints: the first
crushes the perturbation to be zero, but the other pulls it towards a
misclassification. Through a weighted sum of the constraints, and
given enough computing power, the same kind of optimization that
trained the neural network is used to create an adversarial sample.
3.4.3 DeepFool. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [33] used an entirely dif-
ferent approach to make their attacks : they considered that any
classifier has locally-linear boundaries, allowing the local use of
hyperplanes. The decision hyperplane is such that if one moves
parallel to it, they will never cross the boundary and thus will never
find an adversarial example. By taking the orthgonal direction, one
can make sure that they have the fastest way to burst out of the deci-
sion boundary. In order to compensate for the linearity hypothesis,
the author use an iterative method to keep these approximations
within a close radius.
DeepFool on the field. A White-Box attacker tries to output a
wide number of photos triggering the same classification confi-
dence for every different class. This would yield a local topology
of the multi-dimensional geometry of the decision boundary. They
could thus identify the closest hyperplane-boundary to their cur-
rent point. This equivalent naive method would lead to a gigantic
amount of computation. The authors use an algorithm based on a
per-boundary geometry to quickly find the nearest way out of the
current class, thus triggering a misclassification.
We will give a practical explanation of DeepFool. The attacker
can compute at every step the set of linear rules that makes them
be in the class they want to escape, and make a small step away
from the closest combination of those rules. They do so iteratively,
to account for the global non-linearity of DNN.
3.4.4 Surrogate Black-Box Models. So far, every attack required a
White-Box access to the system. But in 2016, Papernot et al. [37]
used the fact that Adversarial Examples can transfer from one Deep
Learning Model to another[41] to create Black-Box attacks that
require no access to the network’s parameters. They train an ap-
proximation of the target model in order to create a White-Box
surrogate. They can then use the transferability property of the ad-
versarial examples: adversarial samples that fool the approximated
model have a high probability of fooling the target model. Some
White-Box attacks transfer better than others: for example, FGSM
attacks transfer well to different classifiers.
Surrogate Black-Box Models on the field. If an attacker has no ac-
cess to the model other than the check reading device, they can first
gather a small dataset of handwritten digits, and train a model on
them. Through jacobian augmentation[37], the attacker will then
distort the digits it has in the direction of the estimated boundaries,
and re-submit to the oracle for evaluation: through this process,
the surrogate neural network will get a low-performance approxi-
mation of the model. This approximate model will be vulnerable
to some adversarial examples. The transferability property make
them likely to also fool the target model.
4 ADVERSARIAL AI DEFENSES
For a systematic review of defenses, we refer the reader to [4] for
their work in the subset of attacks on images.
4.1 Defenses strategies and our focus
A defender protecting a DNN can use three different strategies in
order to increase the model’s robustness to adversarial examples.
Detection Strategy. Defenders can use a Detection algorithm,
above or within the network, in order to detect the adversial nature
of a submitted sample [16, 19, 24, 27, 28, 32, 43]. If the sample is
detected as adversarial, it is rejected and given to a human reviewer
to get its actual meaning.
Reforming Strategy. Defenders can use a Reforming system. In
this paradigm, the sample is transformed in a way that modifies
the sample’s numeric values while preserving its semantics. JPEG
Compression, Bit-Depth Reduction and Error Diffusion, are valid ex-
amples of such transformations. The Reforming system can also be
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learned throughmodels that re-create their inputs [12, 23, 29, 31, 39].
The defender thus expects that, by adding error or removing infor-
mation, they can remove some or all the adversarial perturbations.
This is equivalent to a form of noise reduction.
Regularization Strategy. The last defense mechanism one can
use is based on the Regularization strategy. In this paradigm, the
behaviour of the original system is regularized during a training
in order to modify the way it handles samples that are out of the
classical distribution. This is equivalent to a form of patching: by
changing the program’s behaviour, the defender makes an attack
ineffective against it.
We present below a parallel with SQL Injections, a well-known
problem in information security.
AI Defenses SQLI Defenses
Detection Detect special characters
Reforming Replace special characters
Regularization Parametric statements
We will focus on the Regularization strategy for the following
reasons:
• A Detection system creates an opportunity for a Denial-of-
Service (DoS): the attacker could slightly transform the input
of a user through a Man-In-The-Middle attack and would get
a consistent amount of rejection, while keeping the feedback
sample undistinguishable from the original one.
• A Learnable Reforming system allows an attacker to ex-
ploit another neural network. If succesfully attacked, the
reformer would regenerate a sample that is close to the tar-
get class chosen by the attacker.
• A Non-Learnable Reforming system creates a static de-
fender that an adversary can progressively learn to bypass.
• Regularization strategies have the advantage of presenting
a smaller attack surface, as there would be no other algorithm
than the one used for inference. They trade this advantage
for the requirement of retraining the whole system, opening
themselves to poisoning attacks and creating a high upfront
cost for the defender.
As we consider that DNN need to be trained at least once, the
Regularization strategy will be preferred. We highlight however
that other strategies are less ressource-intensive as they can often
be implemented without retraining the model.
4.2 Current Regularization Techniques
Adversarial Training. One of the first ideas introduced in the de-
fender’s arsenal, the Adversarial Training[18, 41] is based on gen-
erating adversarial samples through white-box attacks in order to
add them to the existing training set. By triggering the error, and
backpropagating it through the network, the system learns to resist
an attack the same way it learns the task at hand.
From an information security perspective, this method has the
disadvantage of defending the network against known attacks only.
There is no guarantee that adversarial training protects against
attacks other than the attacks the system has been trained on. More-
over, this defense can hinder the network’s performance. Madry
et al. [30] address this concern by introducing the idea of an optimal
first-order adversary that could subsum every attacker with the
same order constraints.
With these theoretical guarantees, this approach thus trans-
forms offensive strategies into defensive strategies. This approach
searches for optimal attacks to train the network upon. If success-
fully trained on strong adversarial examples, the system can have
security guarantees.
Gradient Masking/Gradient Shattering. As all current techniques
employ some form of gradient computation, one of the ideas intro-
duced was to reduce the gradient or otherwise hinder the attacker’s
access to the gradient. Gu and Rigazio [21] directly penalize the
network to forcefully lower its gradients through a regularization,
while Papernot et al. [38] use distillation. Distillation is a process
where a first network is trained on one-hot labels (δi=class )i ∈[1,k ]
where k is the number of classes. Then, the first network is dis-
carded, and the predictions of the trained model are used as the
new labels. This teacher network smoothes-out the labels. A second
network is then trained on these smooth labels, thus considerably
lowering the gradient values. The authors claim that the reduction
factor is above 1000.
Black-Box surrogate attacks [37] have bypassed this gradient
masking defense: these attacks do not need any gradient. Thus,
the only way defensive distillation can impact these gardientless
attacks is by regularizing the network’s behaviour. Unfortunately,
even if a modified and extended defensive distillation has been
able to resist some attacks [36], some attacks [9] can still generate
adversarial samples bypassing this defense.
Nayebi and Ganguli [34] have used a regularization function
rewarding using the saturation values of activations. Network acti-
vations that are far from a zero-gradient point are penalized through
a regularization.
Various similar methods create a non-differentiable variant of
their model at test time to deny any access to the gradient: Athalye
et al. [5] have systematically reviewed — and bypassed — these
so-called "gradient shattering" techniques.
Ross and Doshi-Velez [40] add another regularization term to the
loss. Rather than only regularizing the parameters’ values during
the training, they also regularize the value of the input gradient
through double backpropagation[13]. This gradient reflects how
much each variation of the input can change the class. By dimin-
ishing this value, the defender forces any attacker to create larger
perturbations. The authors claim that successful adversarial sam-
ples against their system have had their meanings modified, and
thus cannot be deemed adversarial.
4.3 Other defensive techniques
4.3.1 Feature Squeezing. Xu et al. [43] have shown that, by re-
ducing the attacker’s sample space by using semantic-preserving
compression / filtering (eg. going from greyscale to Black andWhite
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images), one can detect adversarial samples. We do so using the fact
that legitimate inputs often create agreeing predictions when in-
ferred on through different compressions. For adversarial samples,
these predictions are different.
4.3.2 Thermometer Encoding. Discovered by Buckman et al. [8],
this method discretizes the values of the dataset according to arbi-
trary thresholds. As an example, if we have 4 tresholds at (80, 60, 40, 20)
and values between 0 and 100, 42 will be encoded as (0, 0, 1, 1), and
77 as (0, 1, 1, 1)
5 MOTIVATIONS FOR SPARTAN NETWORKS
5.1 Discretization
When given labelled data, a classifier is usually given dimensonally-
large inputs. Input dimensionalities can vary from several hundred
to a milion. However, label space dimensionality ranges from 2 to a
hundred. This means that the input space is orders of magnitude
larger than the output space.
For example, the CAL10K music dataset[42] has a compressed
size of 2.1GB, but the size of the annotations file is 10MB. For the
images dataset, the standard MNIST handwritten digits dataset[26]
has 10 different possible annotations and thus can be stored on four
bits. The digital image needs 6272 bits to be stored.
DNN can succesfully create a reliable approximator that can clas-
sify correctly and reliably given an appropriate amount of labelled
data in standard settings. Adversarial examples show that there are
pockets of inputs present in the high-dimensional space that are
missclassified. Adversarial training provides a way to change the
function approximated by neural networks, but it cannot guarantee
that it reliably "patched" the system. Even if augmented, the num-
ber of training datapoints is indeed negligible in comparison to the
number of possible inputs for a given class. High-dimensionality
creates a disadvantage for the defender.
Given an adequate ϵ (1) the perturbation is not perceptible to a
human observer, but successfully tricks the network into giving a
wrong answer. This means that:
• the input space of encoded samples has a local density greater
than human distinguishability power.
• the network behaviour is extremely sensitive to small changes.
In neural layers using a ReLU or ReLU-equivalent activation
function, stimulus perception is almost always near linear or near
multilinear. Thus, any small variation of the stimulus can be propa-
gated through the neural network using the fact that all operations
are differentiable. The ReLU is made to be equal to the identity
function when recieving a positive input, meaning that the ReLU is
a linear function when activated.
As an example, human observers cannot distinguish colors be-
tween {61, 175, 250}RGB and {61, 170, 250}RGB, but can distinguish
cyan from blue. The DNN however can distinguish the former ex-
tremely well.
The attacker, by modifying the value of parts of the input by a
small amount, can also make the value of activation function vary
by a proportional amount. This perturbation will be propagated
to all affine combinations including the perturbed inputs. As the
propagation goes forward, the perturbation, if cleverly crafted by
the attacker, spreads and its amplitude grows within the network,
using the weights of the network to trick and force the network
to output another value. This exploitation can be done for any
network having a succession of locally-linear activation functions,
through the Taylor expansion of any differentiable function.
Various authors have stated [3, 8] that excessive linearity seems
to be a point of vulnerability of neural networks.
From Xu et al. [43], we learned that squeezing features could
sometimes prevent adversarial perturbations from being effective.
Buckman et al. [8] extend this idea with the Thermometer Encoding.
We extend on the Thermometer Encoding strategy by learning the
tresholds that are useful to correctly do the task while using the
minimal number of information.
Hence our hypotheses are as follows:
• Current neural networks exhibit locally-linear properties
that can be used to slide the sample. classification towards
another class.
• The dimensionality is one of the factors allowing attackers
to find a good attack vector.
We summarize all the problems discussed above in Fig. 1. A Deep
Feedforward Neural Network has a very large input space for a
small output space and excessive linearity allows the attacker to
explore the space and find an adversarial examples.
The human response to color seems to be non-linear, as seen in
Fig 2. The little perturbation is not seen, and double this perturba-
tion is. The tresholding does not destroy any semantics, as one can
recognize the digit.
When stimuli values are discretized, small changes to any stimu-
lus must go past the next threshold to create any perturbation. The
attacker will thus have to push the values further than it normally
would in order to put a valid perturbation, that would be visible to
an observer. Two samples on the same threshold are indeed consid-
ered as the same to the system. The work of Buckman et al. [8] is
using this idea.
The non-linearity of discretization as well as its saturation prop-
erties could restrain an attacker from propagating its perturbations
throughout any DNN.
Previous attemps failed at training with staircase-like functions,
that are inherently non-differentiable, as the ’derivative’ of these
functions is a sequence of impulses.
5.2 Binary Encoding
As seen previously in the works of Buckman et al. [8], one can use
a vector-of-bits encoding to make a network more robust against
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Figure 1: A Deep Feedforward Neural Network. If the ReLU
or any locally-linear activation function is used, an attacker
can find, out of all the possible weights, the highest weights
bending prediction towardsmisclassification. Redmeans an
increase, blue a decrease. By increasing the value of a part
of the input, the attacker can linearly manipulate part of
the calculation and decrease the current probability of the
current class and increase the probabilty of another
adversarial perturbations. Combined with the work of Nayebi and
Ganguli [34], we hypothesize that robust learning in DNN can be
achieved by:
• making their behaviour as non-linear and saturated as pos-
sible;
• reducing the attack space for the attacker by squeezing it;
• creating a binary array instead of float activation values.
We aim at learning an optimal way to achieve this through back-
propagation, by creating new layers of neurons. These neurons will
learn this behaviour by themselves, however we make sure that the
following requirements are met:
• The performance on the test dataset must stay relatively
close to an unprotected counterpart.
• We must find a way to learn a highly non-differentiable
filtering that can interface with backpropagation.
We thus create a processing layer, that we called filtering layer,
whose behaviour is made to be extremely non-linear. This layer
Figure 2: In reading order: a non-perturbed image, an image
with a little, 5% white, vertical bar next to the number, the
10% version, and a thresholded version, with 3 equidistant
thresholds, effectively putting the perturbation at 25%. The
perturbation becomes much easier to see, while the image
keeps its meaning
has a discrete, low-cardinality value range. We can train it through
backpropagation. We modify the DNN of figure 1 into the DNN of
figure 3 with these ideas. Note that Courbariaux et al. [11] have
already proposed restricted-cardinality activation functions.
The processing would use the Heaviside step function, where
the activation function’s definition range is orders of magnitude
larger than the output range. In this case, 9 orders of magnitude for
the Heaviside, instead of less than 1 for the ReLU. As we get less
information-bits for each neuron, we destroy more information.
This process will be called data-starving.
To better understand the interest of data-starving, we emphasize
that most activation functions are encoded on from 16 to 64 bits,
most commonly 32. 32-bit-float activation functions like the 32-
ReLU have 231 possible values, as only positive values are different
from one another. While these activation functions show a high
number of possible states, training set cardinalities are orders of
magitude lower than the possible number of states. Thus, unex-
plored areas in those activation functions can be exploited by an
adversary to find adversarial examples. The defender can thus try
to reduce the amount of states in each layer by various methods.
These methods include using lower weights, or adding a saturation
value. This idea was also exposed in the work of Xu et al. [43].
We decide to reduce the attacker’s space as much as possible,
by taking an activation function that outputs only two possible
values. We will thus use the Heaviside step function as an activation
function in the filtering Layer.
5.3 Spartan Training
During the training, the filtering layers data-starve the network
because there are few possible output values out of them. Moreover,
these layers are regularized by the amount of signal they let through.
To do this, we use a L1 loss on the activations of the network. Thus,
this added loss is proportional to the amount of signal that the
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Figure 3: By breaking the linearity and outputting only dis-
crete values, we make sure that an attacker cannot use gra-
dient descent to find an adversarial example. DU stands for
Discrete Unit.
system let through. In addition to this loss, the network uses a train-
ing loss based on the error, which is standard for training DNN.
The training loss plays directly against the loss of the filtering layer.
To lower the training loss, the system needs to get information
that increases the filtering loss. The only way to reduce the train-
ing loss is by destroying information that is likely to increase the
filtering loss. We thus have two competitors within the network
fighting to reduce their losses.
The self-adversarial behaviour of the network shall allow the
system to harden itself during this seemingly Spartan Training1, by
allowing it to reduce the value ranges within the network activa-
tions. The attacker will either have to generate a high-amplitude
adversarial noise, or stay in the regulated input space, more re-
stricted, requiring more computing power, and thus yielding a
higher cost for the attacker.
We define the network composed of a data-starving layer con-
nected to a neural network and trained with a composite loss a
1The ancient Spartan Training was known to be extremely harsh.
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Figure 4: The Spartan version of the DNN: the first layer is
severely squeezing the dimensionality of the input, and out-
puts binary values only. Furthermore, the activation of each
neuron is added to the global loss of the neural network (L1),
forcing this layer to output as few signal as possible.
Spartan Network. To understand the Spartan Training and the fil-
tering layer effect, we transform the Discrete-DNN of Fig. 3 into
the Spartan DNN of figure 4.
6 SPARTAN NETWORK STRUCTURES
In this section, we create three filtering layers and explore the three
different Spartan Networks using them.
6.1 Composite activation function
As stated before, we use the Heaviside step function on the forward
propagation. This activation function’s gradient is zero where it is
defined. The filtering layer thus uses a synthetic gradient in order
to use backpropagation through this zero gradient.
The Heaviside step function’s definition is:
H (x) : R→ {0, 1}
H (x) =
{ 1 if x ≥ 0
0 else
(2)
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Figure 5: Example structure of a Convolutional Spartan Net-
work for images, sf is the scaling factor, the weight of the
filtering regularization relatively to the training loss
On the backwards propagation, the function could be, for ex-
ample, replaced with the arctangent activation function, with the
following properties:
arctan’(x) = 1
1 + x2
(3)
Mixing definitions 2 and 3, we get the HSAT activation function:
HSAT(x) = H (x),
HSAT’(x) ←− arctan’(x) = 1
1 + x2
(4)
We use a mnemonic of a non-differentiable (or trivially differen-
tiable) function concatenated with a two-letter mnemonic of the
differentiable function whose derivative is used for gradient com-
puting.
HSAT will then be the Heaviside-Arctangent activation function,
HSID the Heaviside-Identity, Cos-HSAT for a Cosine-Heaviside-
Identity function. To simplify, we consider these activation func-
tions to be one activation function, that we will call composite
activation function.
We have investigated four such functions. In the following, H is
the Heaviside step function, and Φ is the normal distribution used
as a function.
Forward Backward Mnemonic
H id : f (x) = x HSID
H arctan HSAT
H ◦ cos arctan ◦ cos Cos-HSAT
H ◦ cos Φ ◦ cos Cos-HSND
Feedforward Neural Networks are trained through backprop-
agation, and, while other weight updates exist, this method has
demonstrated its power over the past years. If we were to use
backpropagation as-is on this filtering layer however, we would
be unable to update its weights or biases, as the derivative of the
Heaviside step function is zero on all values where the function is
differentiable. This is due to the fact that the Heaviside step function
is the integral of the Dirac impulse function δ . Thus, no gradient
can be used to update the biases without the synthetic gradient.
Hence the decision to arbitrarily chose to replace the Heaviside
step function’s derivative by another function’s derivative on the
backwards pass.
We will test some replacement derivative function candidates
stated above in our Experiments section.
With the idea of a Forward-Backwards composite activation func-
tion, we decouple the forward propagation from the backwards
propagation dynamics on this layer, opening the path to use more
complex update functions.
Note that this separation idea has also been explored in a gradient
approximation attack context in the work of Athalye et al. [5], under
the name Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation or BPDA.
We differ from this work as the selection of the Backward pass
is arbitrary, and has no need to be a close approximation of the
function. We nonetheless keep the derivative sign to mirror the
general behaviour of the original function.
6.2 Candidate Filtering layers
Aiming to learn different thermometer encodings [8] through back-
propagation, the filtering layers focus on destroying irrelevant in-
formation. We propose and implement candidate layers exhibiting
this property.
We will take the number of dimensions of the encoding as an
hyperparameter β . β = 4, for example, will mean that there are four
thresholds, and thus five possible values for the encoding.
6.2.1 Convolution-Filtering. The simplest way filter information
with convolutions is to use the Heaviside step activation function
into standard convolutional layers with a 1 × 1 kernel.
For every filter, each channel of an input image will be multiplied
by a learned parameter and a bias will be added, before going
through the Heaviside activation function
This non-differentiable activation function can allow the network
to output thermometer encodings, as, with b the bias of the unit
andw a weight:
HS(wx + b) = 1⇔ wx + b > 0⇔ x > − b
w
(5)
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By having various values for − bw we can create a thermometer
encoding created by an activation function and learned through
backpropagation, as was our goal.
6.2.2 Offset-Filtering. To prove that the robustness of the model is
not convolution-dependent, we can also implement the filtering us-
ing a locally connected layer. One can vary the amount of neurons
in the layer. The filtering layer is as large as the input. The neurons
in the layer have only one connection, and their weights are con-
strained to be one. Only their biases are learned during training.
We effectively create a composition between a binary filter and an
image mask learned by the system.
6.3 Candidate composite activation functions
6.3.1 HSID. The Heaviside-Identity activation function definition
is as follows:
HSAT(x) = H (x),
HSAT’(x) ←− id′R(x)
HSAT’(x) ←− 1
(6)
This composite activation function is interesting because the
backward pass is not an approximation of the foward pass.
6.3.2 HSAT. The Heaviside-Arctangent activation function defini-
tion is as follows:
HSAT(x) = H (x),
HSAT’(x) ←− arctan’(x)
HSAT’(x) ←− 1
1 + x2
(7)
6.3.3 HSAT ◦ Cosine. We compose the HSAT function with a co-
sine in order to get a learnable but square activation function. The
Heaviside-Arctangent◦Cosine activation function definition is as
follows:
HSAT(cos(x)) = H (cos(x)),
HSAT’(cos(x)) ←− arctan’(cos(x))
HSAT’(cos(x)) ←− − sin(x)
1 + cos(x)2
(8)
6.3.4 HSND ◦ Cosine. We modify the previous activation function
using the normal distribution as a function for the gradient part.
HSND(cos(x)) = H (cos(x)),
HSND’(cos(x)) ←− Φ′(cos(x))
HSND’(cos(x)) ←− −x sin(x)Φ(x)
(9)
We used µ = 0,σ = 1 as the base values for the normal distribution.
While the normal distribution requires more computation, it is
mathematically more relevant, as the dirac δ impulse is the limit of
the normal distribution as σ ⇒ 0. We will test different values for
σ to see whether a synthetic gradient that fits the foward activation
function’s gradient more closely — that is, using a σ closer to 0 —
yields better results.
We can see on Fig. 6 that the derivative part of the composite
activation functions are "smoothed out" variants of their spiky,
non-differentiable counterparts.
x
HSAT(x)
x
HSAT(cos(x))
x
HSND(cos(x))
Figure 6: Three candidate composite activation functions:
the Heaviside-Arctangent (y = HSAT(x)), the Cosine-
Heaviside-Arctangent function y = HSAT(cos(x)), and
the Cosine-Heaviside-NormalDistribution function y =
HSND(cos(x)). The blue plot is the forward activation func-
tion, the red plot the backwards derivative. The green plot
is the comparison between HSID (green) and HSND (red)
derivatives
6.4 Loss Regularizations of the candidates
The following section shows the regularizations of the various
candidate layers we experimented on.
As seen in Fig. 5, Spartan Networks have a scaled loss Regular-
ization that rewards the filtering layer when it data-starves the
network if sf > 0.
6.4.1 Convolution-Filtering. A simple L1 activation regularizer is
proposed. As the number of activation is reduced, the number of
bright, activated pixels diminishes, data-starving the network.
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6.4.2 Offset-Filtering. The filtering layer adds a term to the loss
function to penalize the network if it gives away too much infor-
mation. We need a loss function that attains its maximum at a half
of the function value distrubtion and is 0 at the edges. The entropy
function is the best candidate, and we thus define the regularization
function as:
L((Bi )i ∈N) =
N∑
i=1
Bi loд(Bi )
Bi =
bi − xmini
xmaxi − xmini
(10)
Where N is the input size, (xmaxi ,xmini ) the maximum and min-
imum value of the input for the ith input.
Bi is the rescaled bias, ranging from 0 to 1. This rescaled bias
puts an a priori distribution over the dataset.
Note that this particular Bi holds when we hypothesize that
there is a uniform distribution on the values. In an opposite case,
one can create a cut-off based on a cumulative distribution that can
be used to rescale the biases. A Bi close to 12 will signal that the
probability of drawing a sample pixel value above the threshold is
the same as below.
6.5 Data-Starving Behaviours
6.5.1 Offset-Filtering. The filtering layer minimizes its regulariza-
tion loss if the value of the all rescaled biases of the neurons of the
filtering layer are closer to either 0 or 1. Rescaled biases close to
0 or 1 mean neurons change activation close the the minimum or
the maximum value. The filtering layer thus forces the network to
destroy as much information as it can, due to the behaviour of the
entropy function:
• When the rescaled bias is at 12 , the ranges where HS(x − Bi )
are 0 or 1 are equal and the entropy function is at its maxi-
mum: the layer gives more information. We hence penalize
the fact that the network thrives on information.
• When the rescaled bias is close to 0, HS(x − Bi ) is almost
always 1: we get no extra information as this feature is bound
to be present. Entropy regularization is close to 0
• When the rescaled bias is close to 1, HS(x − Bi ) is almost
always 0. The feature will almost never be present. Entropy
regularization is close to 0.
6.5.2 Convolutional-Filtering. The more the filtering layer acti-
vates, the higher the penalty is because of the activation regulariza-
tion we put on this Filtering Layer. This means that the filters are
biased towards higher thresholds, as a higher threshold value will
decrease the number of inputs dimensions that cross the threshold,
and will thus reduce the activation regularization penalty.
We thus encourage the network to report on a feature only if
this feature is deemed extremely relevant, or if the value is extreme.
We thus restrict the attacker to a visible attack.
7 DISCUSSION & RESULTS
7.1 Implementation
We implement our idea in Keras [10], using parts of the TensorFlow
backend [2] for the implementation of the synthetic gradients. The
general structure of the Spartan Network we implemented is as
follow (first layer first):
• A Filtering Layer, whose parameters will vary but that will
stay on the first layer. (Filtering Layer 1)
• AConvolutional Layer, 32 filters, 3×3 kernel, no stride, ReLU
activation function.
• Another Convolutional Layer, same parameters. ReLU or
Composite activation function. (Optional Filtering Layer 2)
• A 2 × 2 Pooling Layer
• AConvolutional Layer, 32 filters, 3×3 kernel, no stride, ReLU
activation function.
• Another Convolutional Layer, same parameters. ReLU or
Composite activation function. (Optional Filtering Layer 3)
• A 2 × 2 Pooling Layer.
• A Densely Connected Layer with 50 Neurons and ReLU
activation function.
• A 10-classes Softmax.
The base CNN is close to the CNN used as standard ConvNet in
[43].
7.2 Results
We tested a subset of all possible candidates created in the paper.
The candidates we have tested are as follow:
7.2.1 Offset-Filtering. We tested only one network with an offset
filtering on the filtering layer 1, using a HSAT activation function
(Candidate A).
7.2.2 Convolutional-Filtering. We tested the following Spartan Net-
works using the Convolutional Filtering:
• The standard CNN using a HSND on the layer 1, as well as
Cos-HSND layers on layers 2 and 3 (Candidate B)
• The standard CNN using a Cos-HSAT layer on layer 1 (Can-
didate C)
7.2.3 Robustness. We attack the candidate Spartan Networks with
a FGSM attack in surrogate black-box mode with various strengths.
We have used the CleverHans module version 2.1.0 [35] to perform
the attacks. We show our results on Fig. 7.
The filter-regularization scaling factor is sf = 10−5, for all of
the Spartan Networks, and µ = 0,σ = 1 if the Normal Distribution
is used. The number in parenthesis in the legend shows the test
precision (in %) on clean samples.
7.2.4 On the Training of a Network using Composite Activation
Functions. We report the variation of loss over training iteration of
the Candidate C compared to the standard CNN using only ReLU ac-
tivation functions with no filtering layers. Results are seen on Fig. 8.
Spartan Networks arXiv Preprint, Dec 2018,
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
20
40
60
80
100
Epsilon attack-strength value
Te
st
Pr
ec
isi
on
(%
)
Candidate A (98.84)
Candidate B (96.13)
Candidate C (98.52)
Standard CNN(99.06)
Figure 7: Comparison of a Spartan Network vs its vanilla
CNN counterpart, against a FGSM attack with varying
epsilon-strength
As the synthetic gradient allows the Spartan Network to know
the general direction of improvement, it can train even if the Heav-
iside step function does not yield a progressive, differentiable be-
haviour. After some time, the networks’ weights are trained enough
to go past the threshold when required, and the loss drops as sharply
as a standard CNN.
7.2.5 Resistance to Over-capacity. We note that in Fig. 7 Candidate
C’s precision begins to collapse at ϵ values close to 0.5. Note that,
at this level, the noise value is high enough to create a grey picture.
We see however that Candidate B manages to resist even after the
0.5 threshold. Upon further inspection, this Network has a 0.9 cutoff
threshold in its filters with close to 0 bias. This network focuses
on the brightest pixels. The attack did not supress enough bright
pixels to entirely corrupt the digits, and the Spartan Networks finds
the signal through the perturbation.
We report that out of the four given filters, the Candidate C
discarded two filters by making their activation impossible. The
network thus learns to ignore unnecessary capacity, by minimizing
its activation penalty. This resistance is comforted by the fact that
Candidate C learns that 1-bit black and white color is enough to
classify digits succesfully. This result is alignedwith previous results
obtained by Xu et al. [43].
SpartanNetworks thus have a reduced sensitivity to over-capacity.
We argue that this resistance is trading robustness for reduced per-
formance. This resistance assures that the hyperparameters intro-
duced by Spartan Networks do not slow the hyperperameter tuning
phase.
Figure 8: Loss history during the training of a classical CNN
and a Spartan Network. We see a latency in the loss drop of
the Spartan Network’s training.
8 RISK EVALUATION OF A
ROBUSTNESS-PERFORMANCE TRADEOFF
Spartan Networks sacrifice a bit of precision for robustness. No-
tions of robustness-precision tradeoffs were already mentionned in
[17, 23].
To give a risk analysis of a situation, consider a Spartan Network
used in the context of a 4-digits check reading system, and consider
an adversarial check paper that automatically gets missclassified
as a 9999$ check. Let ∆CN→SN be the risk delta linked with going
from a "ConvNet" to a "SpartaNet". As the risk is the probability of
occurence times the impact, we get:
∆CN→SN = (peSN IeSN + ptSN ItSN ) − (peCN IeCN + ptCN ItCN )
Where I is an average impact value, p a probability of an event hap-
pening, SN and CN stand for Spartan Network and Convolutional
Network missclassification and t and e describe a theft scenario,
and an error scenario respectively.
As the Network does not change the Impact, only the probability,
we have:
∆CN→SN = (peSN − peCN )Ie + (ptSN − ptCN )It
Each of the above probabilities is a joint event of an scenario hap-
pening, and a missclassification happening. We consider the two
events disjoint.
∆CN→SN = (p(e, SN ) − p(e,CN ))Ie + (p(t , SN ) − p(t ,CN ))It
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We consider only abnormal check reading. α is the amount of mali-
cious bank checks in the overall non-normal checks. Let p(e, SN ) −
p(e,CN ) = ∆err ,p(t ,advSN ) − p(t ,advCN ) = ∆adv , we get that:
∆CN→SN = (1 − α)∆err Ie + α∆adv It
Diminishing the risks means that ∆CN→SN < 0, and in this case,
we obtain:
α >
∆err Ie
∆err Ie − ∆adv It
Spartan Networks are less precise on clean samples. Thus, they
are more relevant in adversarial settings. This means that there is a
minimum amount of malicious checks that must be in use for the
bank to have an interest in them.
For instance, if we hypothesize that the attack is a ϵ = 0.3 FGSM
attack, we see in Fig. 7 that a Spartan Network is more robust to this
attack by 20%. However, we must also consider that our Network
comes with ∼ −0.5% precision on non-adversarial inputs. The risk
analysis must take into account the fact that non-malicious checks
are being misclassified more often than with a ConvNet.
Risk Management Implications. For example, if a non-malicious
error on a 4 digits check costs on average 50$, and a malicious error
costs 8999$ (1000$ → 9999$), Spartan Networks begin to reduce
the risk when around one erroneous check on 7200 is malicious.
We thus recommend that Spartan Networks be used in conjunc-
tion with attack detection, that can use Detection strategies. In
this setup, a classical, high-performance network would do the in-
ferrence until an attack is detected. When such an attack happens, a
Spartan Network could be used as a fallback network. In this adver-
sarial setting, their robustness would overcome their performance
issues.
9 CONCLUSION
Wehave presented SpartanNetworks, deep neural networks that are
given a data-starving layer in order to select relevant features only.
The space-lowering effect allows the system to be more resistant
to adversarial examples. Filtering layers reduce performance, but
can, in specific threat models, be a cost-effective way to reduce an
attacker’s stealthiness and success rate. This robustness method is
made by trying to select relevant features, thus reinforcing deep
learning in its promise that feature selection can, in a long-term
view, be automated.
Contributions. Our contributions are the following:
• We introduce the concept of composite activation functions,
by separating the forward propagation and backwards prop-
agation functions in a Deep Neural Network.
• We introduce the idea of a self-adversarial layer, putting
an attack-agnostic layer inside the network to starve the
subsequent layers off of information.
• We create the first Spartan Network using the ideas above,
and test its robustness to black-box attackers.
• We evaluate the performance-robustness tradeoff of Spartan
Networks in a simple threat model.
Future Work. This work puts forward a lot of experiments and
we encourage our fellow researchers to explore on it. Our code will
be Open-Sourced to support this effort, and will be available at:
https://github.com/FMenet.
We also see that the possibilities for remplacement gradients are
endless: One could replace the gradient of a differentiable function
by another to improve the update dynamic while retaining a de-
sireable behaviour, like a gradient close to 1 to avoid exploding or
vanishing gradients.
We expect to use more powerful, deeper and wider architectures
to train on more complex datasets, but the current implementa-
tion of those networks is slow. We aim at producing a faster, more
efficient way to backpropagate efficiently with our replacement
gradients.
Image space topology allows for a smooth exploration of sample
space, as a small euclidian distance often means same semantics.
We leave the study of Spartan Networks on harder sample space
topologies for future work.
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